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SUMMARY
Despite differences in scale, Canada and the U.S. face common challenges in military procurement and there 
is much Canada can learn as both countries pursue reforms. The U.S. employs a system of systems approach, 
based on requirements, resource allocation and acquisition. The process begins with the Joint Capabilities 
and Development System, focused on identifying and prioritizing needs and assessing alternatives. This is 
followed by the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System, which leads to the creation of a 
budget and provides guidance for the project’s execution. The third and final step is the Defense Acquisition 
System, which oversees the development and purchase of the new equipment. While deceptively simple in 
summary, U.S. defence procurement is dogged by problems — particularly cost overruns, a surfeit of key 
players and delayed schedules which degrade troops’ performance in the field. Additionally, the defence 
products market is restricted, inevitably limiting competition, encouraging misbehaviour on the part of 
business and driving up prices. The DoD is in the midst of consultations with contractors and Congress 
is undertaking an effort to rewrite acquisition laws. But the most pressing questions remain: Does a best 
procurement practice exist? If so, what criteria define it? In light of Canada’s new Defence Procurement 
Strategy (DPS), some lessons are clear. Further analysis is needed to figure out whether reforms can succeed 
in so narrow a marketplace. More attention must be paid to shaping contracts and clarifying expectations 
about sticking to schedules. And Ottawa must think carefully about the military’s needs, as it pushes ahead 
with the DPS. In surveying change at the DoD, this brief draws pointed conclusions to which Canada’s defence 
planners must pay heed, if they’re to leave the military stronger than they found it.
1This policy brief presents the U.S. system of defence procurement, examines issues faced within that 
country, provides some thoughts about what constitutes a best procurement practice and concludes 
with some recommendations for Canada. Despite a greater procurement capacity in the U.S., the two 
neighbours face common challenges such as ensuring equipment is procured in a timely and cost-
effective manner, employing procurement dollars to encourage development and finally, developing 
procurement strategies that answer short-term needs, but are flexible given long-term uncertainty. The 
Canadian and American governments should have mutual interests in each other’s defence procurement 
policies, given they share NATO and NORAD mandates in addition to the task of jointly defending 
North America. Recent reforms to U.S. defence procurement and Canada’s newly announced Defence 
Procurement Strategy (DPS)1 present an opportunity to identify some recommendations as Canada 
moves towards changing its acquisition practices. 
1. THE U.S. DEFENCE PROCUREMENT PROCESS
The 2014 U.S. Department of Defence’s Congressional Budget2 for defence procurement exceeds $84 
billion USD with nearly 34 percent dedicated to aircraft, and ships accounting for another 18 percent.3 
36 percent of the resources are spent developing original products. According to the 2014 DoD budget, 
31 new projects exceeding $250 million USD result in nearly $30 billion USD of expenditures. The five 
largest major defence acquisition programs (MDAPs) are the Virginia-class submarines ($3.4 billion 
USD), the P-8A Poseidon (anti-submarine & anti-surface warfare) aircraft, the F-35 joint strike fighter 
(JSF), the EA-18G fighter, and the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle ($1.85 billion USD). In contrast, 
only about seven percent of the funds are allocated toward modifying existing projects. There are 20 
projects with budgets exceeding $100 million resulting in a total allocation surpassing $6.4 billion USD. 
Modifications to the C5-M transport aircraft and Trident II SLBM (ballistic missile) account for one-
third of this category’s allocations. 
The U.S. develops very few products using international partnerships but tends to invest heavily when 
it does do so. The U.S. has six projects under development in international partnership with budgets 
in excess of $2.5 billion USD: the M982 artillery shell, Air Burst Weapons, the JSF, RIM-116 Rolling 
Airframe Missile, and NAVSTAR (NAVigation System using Time And Ranging). That said, the JSF 
accounts for 94 percent of the resources spent on partnerships. 
Acquiring existing products from abroad is rarely done in the U.S. A report titled U.S. Purchases from 
abroad includes defence items, construction, and petroleum purchases; therefore, the percentage spent 
on defence items varies from nine to 13 percent of total purchases from 2007-2012.4 The 2004 National 
Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 108-136) required reporting of prime contracts on defence items and 
1 Appendix 1 contains a list of acronyms.
2 (2014 DoD CB). Excludes data for R, D, T & E that are a separate budget category. Data do not differentiate between new 
and continuing projects. 
3 
Defense Technical Information Center. “FY2014 DoD Congressional Budget Data – House Armed Services Committee” 
available at http://www.dtic.mil/congressional_budget/. Accessed on 26 September 2013. Classification into Jenkins Report 
categories done by author.
4 
DoD.“Report to Congress on Purchases from Foreign Entities, FY 2007,” Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense 
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (ATL), Washington, DC, May 2008; & “Report to Congress on FY2011 
Purchases from Foreign Entities,” May 2012; “Report to Congress on FY2012 Purchases from Foreign Entities,” July 2013. 
Reports do not indicate new procurement.
2components5 from foreign sources; in FY20076 spending in that category accounted for 10 percent.7 Of 
all DoD acquisition that year only two percent of contracts were awarded abroad; Canada obtained 40 
percent of them receiving over $495 million USD.8 With respect to budgeting for 2014, the 2014 DoD 
CB indicates two projects are procured from abroad totalling less than $250 million USD: the German 
XM320 grenade launcher and the Israeli Iron Dome all-weather air defence system.9
A multisystem process
The U.S. employs “a multivariate ‘system of systems’ approach composed of the requirements, resource 
allocation, and acquisition systems.”10 As Schwartz summarizes, “every weapon system in the U.S. 
arsenal is created to satisfy a specific military need (…the requirement), must be paid for by the federal 
budget, and is designed and built with an acquisition system.”11 Only after completing the steps of 
identifying the requirement and obtaining a budget can the process of acquiring the product start. 
Before discussing the process itself, it is useful to understand the rules of the game and its players. 
U.S. procurement is governed by three sets of hierarchically organized regulations starting with those 
applying to all branches of government (i.e., Federal Acquisition Regulations or FAR), then those 
specific to the DoD (i.e., DFAR)12 followed by those specific to its components.13 A Major Defence 
Acquisition Program “…may need to develop as many as 60 different documents, 28 required by 
statute and 32 required by regulation, during its life.”14 In addition to the game being played in a 
structured environment there are also multiple actors, each with their own priorities, and no single 
actor is responsible for all aspects of defence procurement. Key actors include Congress, the Offices of 
Management and Budget, the Secretary of Defense, and the Service Secretary, the Service Acquisition 
Executive, the military service material commands, program management offices, functional support 
organisations, and industry.15 
5 
Included are airframes, aircraft engines, other aircraft equipment, missiles & space systems, ships, combat vehicles, non-
combat vehicles, weapons, ammunition, electronic & communications equipment. 
6 
DoD. “Foreign Sources of Supply: FY2007 Report,” Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for ATL, Washington, DC, 
Sept. 2008. A recent report could not be located.
7 
DoD. “Report to Congress: Purchases from Foreign Entities, FY2007,” Ibid. 
8 
In comparison, the UK received nearly 19 percent of the contracts at $475 million USD.
9 Together procurement among those options is nearly 47 percent of the budget with munitions/missiles accounting for 15 
percent and defence-wide programs and items another 25 percent.
10 
Schwartz, Moshe. “Defense Acquisitions: How DOD Acquires Weapons Systems and Recent Efforts to Reform the 
Process,” CRS Report RL34026 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013).
11 
Schwartz, Ibid., 2.
12 Federal Acquisition Regulation System, July 2009; U.S. DoD, Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, 21 July 
2009.
13 
Army, Navy & Marine Corps, Air Force, Defense Logistics Agency, U.S. Special Operations Command.
14 
Watts, Barry D. and Todd Harrison, Sustaining Critical Sectors of the U.S. Defense Industrial Base (Washington, D.C.: 
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2011), 30.
15 Fox, J. Ronald. Defense Acquisition Reform, 1960-2009: An Elusive Goal (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 
2011), 14.
3Several monitoring agencies are also involved, such as the Justice Department and the inspectors and 
auditing offices of the DoD and the services. Congress employs the Government Accounting Office16 
for program evaluations and the CBO for budgeting, in addition to the CRS and OTA for analyses. 
Inefficiencies arise from the fragmentation of authority and accountability. Requirements, budgeting, 
and project management are undertaken by different agencies, each of which is separately monitored, 
increasing bureaucracy and agency costs. 
The procurement process for a MDAP consists of a three-step system17 (i.e., requirements, budgeting, 
and acquisition). Each step is a system itself but taken together, they are considered the “Big A” of 
acquisition.18 It starts with the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), 
which “identifies, assesses and prioritizes what capabilities the military requires.”19 Sometimes changes 
in doctrine, training, or organisation are sufficient to meet the requirement eliminating the need 
for a DAP. The JCIDS begins with a Capabilities- Based Assessment that examines both needs and 
gaps while recommending solutions. The Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) justifies the material 
solution, if recommended. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) identifies and prioritizes 
requirements, approves the ICD and may recommend a solution. After ICD approval, an Analysis of 
Alternatives, comparing all aspects (i.e., cost, effectiveness, risk, technology) of the possible alternatives 
to the proposed DAP is completed. 
The second step/system is the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBE). A 
Joint Programming Guidance document presents needs and guides proposals. The Program Objective 
Memorandum outlines the proposed DAP’s missions, objectives and budget and guides programming. 
The budgeting stage occurs with programming, though the review processes differ. The execution stage 
occurs with the budget and program evaluations. 
The final step/system is the Defense Acquisition System (DAS)20 or the management process to develop 
and buy weapon systems (i.e., select a source). Each MDAP is managed by an office headed by a 
Program Manager who is supported by a staff and reports to a Program Executive Officer. The DAS uses 
a series of milestones to monitor and manage programs, ensuring they meet statutory and regulatory 
requirements. There are three milestones, the first of which (A) initiates the technology development 
followed by (B) the second that initiates the engineering and manufacturing that is succeeded by (C) the 
third that initiates low-rate production and limited deployment. Schwartz adds, “a program can enter 
the acquisition system at any point in the process as long as the program meets the requirements for that 
phase of the system.”21 There is no clear demarcation between the steps because of the iterative nature of 
development, thus steps occur simultaneously. 
16 
Government Accountability Office, Congressional Budget Office, Congressional Research Services, Office of  
Technology Assessment
17 See Figure 1 in appendix 2.
18 
The final system, the Defense Acquisition System, is the “Little a” acquisition process telling government how to buy but 
excluding requirements and budgeting.
19 
Schwartz, Ibid., 3.
20 DoD Directive 5000.01, the Defense Acquisition System, is a brief document identifying the overarching principles of 
the DAS. The more detailed (80-page) DoD Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, describes 
processes and requirements. The 900-page (and under review) Guidebook serves as the reference regarding information and 
best practices.
21 
Schwartz, Ibid., 7. Each milestone includes a number of decision points that must be reviewed by a Milestone Decision 
Authority. See Schwartz’s summary pp7-8.
4The winning contractor(s) for a MDAP is selected by a Source Selection Authority, “based on 1) 
comparative evaluations of proposals, 2) costs, 3) risk assessment, 4) past performance, 5) contractual 
considerations, and 6) surveys of contractor capabilities.”22 Moreover, little is known about the effects 
of “technical levelling” where a proposal’s technical or design approaches are revealed to competitors 
“to allow them to consider incorporating the proposal’s better and/or less costly features into their own 
proposals.”23 Source selection may be treated as a sub-process in defence procurement, as it involves 
some different agents and is a game with its own separate structure.
2. REFORM ISSUES FACED IN DEFENCE PROCUREMENT
DoD efforts to deal with “cost overruns, schedule delays and an inability to get troops in the field 
the equipment they need when they need it”24 resulted in key policy documents being updated over 
the last decade.25 Steady growth in per-unit costs because of “the longstanding preferences of the 
military services for state-of-the-art weaponry and the cost insensitivity built into the acquisition 
system both before and after source selection”26 is the main problem. A study examining six U.S. 
MDAPs27 experiencing critical cost growth identified common causes among a majority, such as 
an underestimation of the baseline cost, insufficient R, D, T, & E, increases in component costs, 
unanticipated technology integration issues, and inadequate/unstable funding.28 Other DoD reforms 
under consideration include linking manager seniority and experience with the risk of the MDAPs, as 
opposed to the dollar amount, and completing a competition utility analysis for each MDAP. 
Congress engages in reform as well through its annual National Defense Authorization Act as well as 
stand-alone laws.29 Fox cites “the lack of satisfactory information”30 as a key reason for Congressional 
involvement, due to the technical complexity of the systems precluding good estimates of schedule, 
costs, etc., ambiguous program needs affecting estimates of a weapon’s effectiveness creating indecision 
and extending schedules, and program managers not providing full information about delays/obstacles.
Market structures also inhibit reform. While proposals for system reforms are based upon the belief that 
the defence market is a free market, the reality is that in that sphere the invisible hand cannot produce 
efficiency, because buyer’s choices are not based on price and price is not set by the interplay of supply 
and demand.31 In the U.S. defence market, there is one buyer that is also the regulator and a few large 
prime contractors. Only the source selection process involves competition, since after primary contract 
selection the remainder of the development, production, and in-service support is conducted by the 
contractor, giving it a monopoly. Government dependence upon a particular contractor creates price 
insensitivity. Gansler argues policy and DoD regulations, as well as Congressional statutes to improve 
22 
Fox, Ibid, 30.
23 
Fox, Ibid, 30.
24 
Schwartz, Ibid, 12.
25 
Including a new DoD Instruction 5000.02 (the DAS process and requirements document) in 2008 followed by an updated 
instruction document for the JCIDS in 2009, as well as a new version of the JCIDS itself in 2012.
26 
Ibid, Watts & Harrison, 25.
27 
Zumwalt-class Destroyer (DDG-1000), JSF, Longbow Apache Helicopter, Wideband Global Satellite, Excalibur artillery 
round, Navy Enterprise Resource Program
28 
Bickstein, Irv; Charles Nemfakos and Jerry M. Sollinger. 2013. “Digging out Root Causes: Nunn-McCurdy in major 
defence acquisition programs,” Defence ARJ, Vol. 20, No. 2 (July 2013): 128-153.
29 
The most recent being the May 2009 Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act (S.454 /P.L. 111-23).
30 
Fox, Ibid.,16.
31 
Watts and Harrison, Ibid., 13. 
5procurement, are predicated upon the free market presumption and “have not had the desired effects.”32 
In 2011, Carter maintained the 2009 reforms relied on “normal market forces to make the most efficient 
adjustments.”33 
Solutions tend to focus on contracts as the focal point for delegating responsibilities; thus inefficiencies 
may be linked to inappropriate contract design. In defence contracts written prior to 2001, profit was 
negotiated as a percentage of the estimated costs (cost-plus-fixed-fee contracting). It created perverse 
incentives for contractors where spending more creating the product increased profits. In 2002, a 
movement towards award-plus-fixed-fee contracting emerged. In 2013 the Undersecretary for ATL 
emphasized that no single contract type can transform defence efficiency.34 That acknowledgement 
creates an opportunity for recasting defence contractual relations. In February 2014, the Director of 
Defense Procurement & Acquisition Policy invited public comments from contractors and industry to 
identify the undesired impacts, if any, of the over 400 federal defence regulations35 when it comes to 
contracting. An effort to rewrite DoD acquisition laws is underway by Congress and the Pentagon.36 The 
aim is to increase the process’ efficiency and speed.
 Information problems are another source of inefficiency. Since contractors have private information 
(about the technology, production possibilities, etc.), which they use to craft proposals, they may distort 
or misrepresent schedules and capacities. Contracts manage and protect the partners from the lack of 
information prevalent in defence. Contract drafters should identify the sources of risk before negotiations 
and integrate appropriate responses (e.g., penalties, cost-sharing, and flexibility) into the contract. If 
contractors could bind themselves successfully by consenting to penalties if at fault, then overruns and 
delays could be reduced. If the sources of information problems are strategic (i.e., the contractor shaping 
information), then honest actors could commit to modifying behavior. If the problems’ sources are 
structural, i.e., poorly designed contracts, then the solutions are more complex but implementable among 
willing partners. 
Another source of inefficiency is contract designs that fail to account for the interaction between the 
uncertain speed of technological development and the proposed project schedule. Schedule slippage 
occurs in the development phase due to the uneven nature of technological advances. One solution is to 
engage in pre-contractual negotiations during the development phase. One author reports that, “Since 
most cost overruns occur in the early stages of a project’s lifetime due to the uncertainties associated 
with new technology, effective ex ante monitoring, as exemplified by credible pre-contractual risk 
assessments, is crucial to cost containment.”37 
A further solution is to divide the blame for overruns between the contractor and the government in a 
spirit of fairness and responsibility. In French defence procurement, “Firms are required to make final 
bids on the delivery of finished systems and they must, at least in theory, accept all the risks associated 
with any cost overruns that occur.”38 However, due to the uncertainties of the industry, contracts are 
incomplete by nature, leading to renegotiations to decide who is responsible for extra costs and how 
they will be shared. Kapstein shows that “the French have introduced a responsibility principle into 
32 Gansler, Jacques S. The Defense Industry, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1980), 96.
33 
Carter, Ashton. Undersecretary of Defense for ATL, “The Defense Industry Enters a New Era,” remarks at Cowen 
Investment Conference, New York, NY, February 9, 2011.
34 
Parrish, Karen. “Acquisition Chief Discusses ‘Better Buying Power 2.0,’” Armed Forces Press Services, 10 September 2013.
35 
DoD. “Review of Statutory and Regulatory Requirements,”12 February 2014, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-02-
12/html/2014-03038.htm
36 
Weisgerber, Marcus. “Pentagon, Congress Begin Rewriting DoD Acquisition Laws,” 16 February 2014, http://www.
defensenews.com/article/20140216/DEFREG02/302160012/Pentagon-Congress-Begin-Rewriting-DoD-Acquisition-Laws.
37 
Kapstein, Ethan B. “Smart Defense Acquisition: Learning from French Procurement Reform,” Policy Brief, Washington, 
DC: Center for New American Security, December 2009, 3.
38 
Kapstein, Ibid, 3.
6(fixed price) contracting, meaning that those who are actually responsible for failing to meet contractual 
obligations, whether government or industry, must generally pay the costs.”39 However, a shared sense of 
fairness and contract flexibility are crucial for the principle to operate. 
Realizing that the contract must also please multiple actors with divergent priorities is also important, 
since Congress and other agencies prioritize budgets in contrast to the military’s emphasis on 
performance followed by schedule. Delays could be managed through time-certain acquisition according 
to a 2006 assessment panel report on DoD acquisition.40 Scheduling would be a critical factor in 
“balancing trade-offs between cost and performance” and that for most MDAPs a nominal six-year 
timeline from Milestone A to the delivery of the first operational acceptable capability is reasonable.41 
The largest risk reduction opportunities exist between Milestones A and B.42 For it to succeed, the 
services must sacrifice performance in favour of a schedule. It also requires penalty enforcement for 
programs failing to meet that schedule. However, if contractors were prepared to tie their hands by 
committing to a schedule, then a proposal’s value is increased. The same recommendation goes for 
offsets, if contractors limit offset demands and agree to distribute a meaningful percentage towards 
U.S.-owned firms, then a proposal’s value similarly increases. 
3. DOES A BEST PROCUREMENT PRACTICE EXIST?
The question of whether a best procurement practice exists requires criteria for identifying the best. 
Should it be considered the most efficient (i.e., products delivered on-time within budget), most effective 
(i.e., products perform as expected), most economical (i.e., products are provided at low cost), most 
diversified (i.e., products are developed/modified from multiple sources), most innovative (i.e., potential 
for spin-off technologies and commercial applications) etc.? Each of those considerations, if prioritized, 
implies trade-offs with respect to the others. Ranking performance as most important, as for example 
the JSF and its variations, results in cost and schedule being sacrificed (e.g., three critical cost breaches 
from 1997-2009 and multiple schedule extensions). Best practices reflect a knowledge-based approach, 
where ensuring a certain level of knowledge (i.e., technical maturity, stable product design and capable 
manufacturing processes) is acquired before proceeding to the next phase. MDAPs experiencing cost 
overruns often fail to adhere to that approach. 
A nation’s relative size shapes its need for best practices as states with limited resources cannot absorb 
risks and negative effects as easily as larger states. Overruns and delays have smaller impacts when 
budgets are larger. Larger budgets make possible more original product development. Budget size is 
a non-negligible structural constraint shaping choices since original MDAPs involve risk. The risk 
increases with technological immaturity are counterbalanced by the profit potential from technological 
development, spin-offs, and commercial applications. 
Around 47 percent of the 2014 DoD budget was divided among the four procurement options with the 
largest slice (36 percent) going toward developing original products followed by modifying existing 
products (seven percent). Allocating so much of the budget to original products is simply too much 
risk for a medium-sized economy. Rather it should distribute about 30 percent of the budget between 
modifying existing products and procuring foreign products favouring off-the-shelf procurement over 
potentially costly modifications. Around 10 percent of the budget should go to developing original 
products domestically. The remaining five percent should be allocated to development in international 
39 
Kapstein, Ibid., 3.
40 Kadish, Ronald. Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment. Washington, D.C.: DoD, 2005, 13.
41 
Ibid., 50.
42 See section 1.b. for milestones.
7partnerships. Distributing resources as such places only 15 percent of the budget in the riskier options 
(i.e., original and partnership products). The choice of which MDAPs to place in the riskier options 
should be shaped by the availability of alternative options to meet the requirement, feasibility (i.e., 
technical feasibility given current capacities), comparative advantage, exportability for profit, and the 
capacity for innovation spin-offs and follow-on income in the commercial sector. Original development 
is riskiest for a medium-sized country so partnering to develop products is recommended. Though 
Canada has the most experience partnering with the U.S. when it comes to defence production, it should 
seek to diversify both its partners and defence product suppliers by looking towards key allies in Europe 
and Asia. 
4. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
In light of Canada’s new DPS, there are several lessons to extract from this analysis of U.S. defence 
procurement. First, greater analysis is needed to determine how/if procurement policy reforms can 
succeed given the special nature of the defence market. Second, the defence procurement contract 
is at the center of the transaction and greater attention is needed to ensure that contracts delineate 
expectations in the case of overages or delays. Contractors should also be willing to tie their hands by 
committing to schedules and minimizing offsets. Finally, Canada must carefully consider its capacities, 
strengths, and mandates as it further implements its DPS in order to maximise the benefits from this 
opportunity.
8APPENDIX 1
ATL  Acquisition, Technology & Logistics 
DPS  Canada’s Defence Procurement Strategy 
CBO  Congressional Budget Office 
CRS  Congressional Research Service 
DAS  Defense Acquisition System 
DFAR  Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations 
DoD  Department of Defense 
DoD CB  Department of Defense Congressional Budget 
FAR  Federal Acquisition Regulations 
GAO  Government Accounting Organization 
ICD  Initial Capabilities Document 
JCIDS  Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 
JROC  Joint Requirement Oversight Council 
JSF   F-35 Joint Strike Fighter 
(M)DAP   (Major) Defense Acquisition Program 
R,D,T &E  Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation 
USD  U.S. dollars
9APPENDIX 2
FIGURE 1 DOD’S DEFENCE ACQUISITION STRUCTURE
Source: Schwartz, Ibid, 3.
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BETTER OFF DEAD: “VALUE ADDED” IN ECONOMIC POLICY DEBATES
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/better-dead-%E2%80%9Cvalue-added%E2%80%9D-economic-policy-debates
Trevor Tombe | March 2015
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF SOCIAL ASSISTANCE IN ONTARIO: TAKING STOCK TWO YEARS LATER
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/report-commission-review-social-assistance-ontario-taking-stock-two-years-later
Munir Sheikh | March 2015
MINING TAXATION IN COLOMBIA
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/mining-taxation-colombia
Duanjie Chen and Guillermo Perry | February 2015
ESPlannerBASIC CANADA
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/esplannerbasic-canada
Laurence Kotlikoff | February 2015
